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Election outcomes can be difficult to predict. A recent example is the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, where Hillary Clinton lost five states that had been predicted to go for her, 
and with them the White House. Most election polls ask people about their own voting 
intentions: whether they will vote, and if so, for which candidate. We show that, compared to 
own-intention questions, social-circle questions that ask participants about the voting intentions 
of their social contacts improved predictions of voting in the 2016 U.S. and 2017 French 
presidential elections. Responses to social-circle questions predicted election outcomes on 
national, state, and individual levels, helped explain last-PLQXWHFKDQJHVLQSHRSOH¶VYRWLQJ
intentions, and provided information about the dynamics of echo chambers among supporters of 
different candidates. 
Past polls have asked people to indicate who they think will win the election, or to judge 
the probability that each candidate will win. Possibly because people know how their social 
contacts will vote,1 such election-winner questions have successfully predicted many election 
outcomes2,3. However, election-winner questions have some imperfections. They do not 
straightforwardly predict actual vote shares because they ask for expectations that a candidate 
will win and not for the estimated percentage of voters who will vote for the candidate. They 
produce predictions on the national but not on the state and individual levels. Furthermore, they 
rely RQSHRSOH¶VLQIHUHQFHVDERXWWKHJHQHUDOSRSXODWLRQ, which are likely influenced by 
sometimes inaccurate predictions reported in the media4.  
Social-circle questions can provide useful information in election polls for several 
reasons. It has been shown that people can provide relatively accurate judgments about various 
characteristics of their immediate social circles5,6. Averaged across a national sample, 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶judged percentage of their social contacts with specific characteristics (such as 
having health problems) tend to come closer to the actual percentage in the general population 
than UHVSRQGHQWV¶MXGJed percentage of the population with these characteristics7.   Moreover, 
reporting about friends¶SUHIHUHQFHVIRUDQXQSRSXODUcandidate can be less embarrassing than 
admitting to personally having these preferences8,9. 3HRSOH¶VUHSRUWVDERXWWKHLUVRFLDOFRQWDFWV
may also illuminate the social interactions that shape their beliefs and behaviours, and anticipate 
changes in own intentions over time due to social influence processes10,11. Finally, social-circle 
questions provide information about individuals who were not included in the sample of a 
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particular poll, thus implicitly increasing sample size and possibly reducing some of its 
sampling, nonresponse, and coverage bias12. 
We studied the usefulness of social-circle questions in two different elections: the 2016 
U.S. presidential election, and the 2017 French presidential election. Held on November 9, the 
U.S. election essentially focused on two candidates - Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Other 
candidates were collectively not expected to win more than about 10% of the vote. In contrast, 
French elections involved at least five prominent candidates: François Fillon, Benoît Hamon, 
Marine Le Pen, Emmanuel Macron, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, while also including six others 
with less prominence. In France, the election was held in two rounds: the first round occurred on 
April 23, with the second round on May 7 focusing on the top two candidates ± Marine Le Pen 
and Emmanuel Macron.  
In each country, ZHDVNHGTXHVWLRQVDERXWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VRFLDOFRQWDFWV in two parts: (a) 
³:KDWSHUFHQWDJHRI\RXUVRFLDOFRQWDFWVDUHOLNHO\WRYRWHLQWKHXSFRPLQJHOHFWLRQ?´DQG (b) 
(³2IDOO\RXUVRFLDOFRQWDFWVZKRDUHOLNHO\WRYRWHZKDWSHUFHQWDJHGR\RXWKLQNZLOOYRWHIRU
[candidate]"´; (see Methods). In the U.S., we asked social-circle questions in two national 
surveys: the GfK election poll conducted in the week before the election13 and the USC 
Dornsife/LA Times election poll conducted daily from July 2016 until after the election14,15. We 
compared the social-circle questions with two versions of own-intention questions: a standard 
version in the GfK poll, ³If you were to YRWHLQWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQWKDW¶VEHLQJKHOGRQ
1RYHPEHUWKZKLFKFDQGLGDWHZRXOG\RXFKRRVH"´13, and a probabilistic version in the USC 
poll, ³,I\RXGRYRWHLQWKHHOHFWLRQZKDWLVWKHSHUFHQWFKDQFHWKDW\RXZLOOYRWHIRU&OLQWRQ, 
Trump, or someone else"´16,17. Both were preceded by a question about going to vote at all (see 
Methods). In addition, the USC poll elicited election-ZLQQHUH[SHFWDWLRQV³:KDWLVWKHSHUFHQW
FKDQFHWKDW&OLQWRQ7UXPSRUVRPHRQHHOVHZLOOZLQ"´In France, we asked the social-circle 
questions in the election poll conducted by survey research company BVA on a national sample 
in the week before the first round of the election. We compared the answers to social-circle 
questions with answers to own-intention questions of the form ³:KLFKFDQGLGDWHDUH\RXPRVW
likely to vote for"´ (see Methods). These data allowed us to ask five research questions. 
Our first research question examined whether asking about social circles improved 
predictions of national election results. Tables 1 and 2 summarize results from the U.S. and 
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French elections, including established measures of prediction error. In the U.S., social-circle 
questions were more accurate than own-intention questions, in predicting the whole distribution 
of vote shares for different candidates (Table 1 and Supplementary Information). We found 
lower values of error measures Mosteller 318 and ܣҧ19,20 for social-circle than for own-intention 
questions. Compared to own-intention questions, social-circle questions predicted the difference 
between Clinton and Trump less well, as indicated by error measure Mosteller 518, which 
considers only the two main candidates. Which of these well-established error measures is more 
important will depend on the number of prominent candidates in a given election, and on the 
aims of the particular poll. In France, social-circle questions performed better than own-intention 
questions on all error measures and in both election rounds (Table 2). In both countries, social 
circle questions produced more accurate predictions of participation rates, with a particularly 
large improvement over own-intention questions in France. Possibly reflecting media forecasts 
of a substantial Clinton win, the 86&SROO¶Velection-winner question erroneously predicted that 
Clinton would win, giving her a 53.4% chance compared to 42.5% for Trump and 4.1% for other 
candidates.  
Second, we investigated whether social-circle questions improved predictions of state 
election results. Social-circle questions produced more accurate predictions of state winners, as 
compared to own-intention questions, as seen in both US polls. Consequently, social-circle 
questions predicted the number of electoral votes for each candidate better than own-intention 
questions (Table 1 and Supplementary Information). USC¶V social-circle questions were the only 
ones that predicted Trump winning the majority of electoral votes. Moreover, GfK¶V and USC¶V 
polls achieved above-chance accuracy in predicting winners at the state level, especially with 
social circle questions. These results were obtained despite sample sizes of only 27 participants 
SHUVWDWHIRU*I.¶VSROOVand 44 per state for 86&¶VSROOV*I.¶VDQG86&¶VSROOVUHVSHFWLYHO\
predicted 67% and 77% of states correctly with social-circle questions, as compared to 65% and 
61% with own-intention questions. For further comparison, aggregates of 3,073 state polls 
(including 60 polls per state on average) predicted 90% of states correctly21. Social-circle 
questions were particularly useful for predicting election outcomes in a priori defined ³VZLQJ
VWDWHV´22 (CO, FL, IA, MI, NC, NV, NH, OH, PA, VA, and WI). For GfK and USC, social circle 
questions respectively predicted 82% and 73% of swing states correctly, while own-intention 
questions accurately predicted 46% and 64% of swing states correctly, and aggregates of 3,073 
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state polls accurately predicting 55% of swing states correctly. Social-circle questions were also 
more successful than both own-intention questions and aggregate polls in predicting winners of 
the five swing states that unexpectedly went to Trump (FL, MI, NC, PA, and WI). They 
predicted four of these states correctly, compared to three by own-intention questions and zero 
by aggregate polls. In sum, these results suggest that people possess valuable information about 
their social circles, which could be used to improve election predictions at national and state 
levels.  
< TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE > 
Third, we examined whether social-circle questions benefited predictions of individual 
voting behaviour. We found that, over time, changes in social-circle reports predicted subsequent 
changes in own voting intentions. For participants who completed USC surveys in August, 
September, late October/early November, and immediately after the election (N=1,263), social-
circle questions contributed to the explanation of their actual voting behaviour over and above 
own-intention questions. Fig. 1A shows that, up until the week before the election, participants 
reported that they were on average more likely to vote for Clinton than for Trump, while more 
ended up voting for Trump than for Clinton. Fig. 1B shows a reversal toward Trump in social-
circle reports as early as September 2016, when own-intention questions were still predicting a 
lead for Clinton. A weighted average of own intentions and social-circle estimates led to more 
accurate predictions of individual voting behaviour than own intentions alone (with weights 
being regression coefficients in a model including both types of questions, see Extended Data 
Table 1). Of note, election-winner expectations did not contribute to explanations of voting 
behaviour over and above own intentions and social-circle questions (Extended Data Table 1). 
Similar patterns were observed throughout the pre-election period, with own intentions and 
social-circle reports jointly contributing to explanations of own intentions in subsequent survey 
waves (Extended Data Tables 2a and 2b).  
< FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
Fourth, we analysed whether social-circle questions helped to explain last-minute 
changes in voting intentions. Not all participants ended up voting for the candidate they 
announced as their favourite in the week before the election (Extended Data Table 3). For 
example, participants whose own intentions mismatched those in their social circles were less 
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likely to eventually vote for their intended candidate (Extended Data Fig. 1). While some of 
these participants had less strong intentions to vote for their preferred candidate in the first place, 
our overall results suggest that social-circle reports foretold a switch in voting intentions before it 
happened. Generally, cKDQJHVLQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VRFLDOFLUFOHVRYHUWLPHSUHGLFWHGWKHLUODWHU
intentions to vote for specific candidates and to vote at all, as revealed by vector autoregression 
modelling and Granger causality tests23,24 (Fig. 1C, Extended Data Tables 4 and 5). This pattern 
of results was found for both Trump and Clinton voters, suggesting that participants' perceptions 
of how social contacts would vote affected their own beliefs regarding the candidates.  
Additionally, Trump voters appeared to influence later changes in their social circles while 
Clinton voters did not.  
Our final research question was whether asking about social-circles provided insights 
about the dynamics of echo chambers. Social-circle questions revealed increased 
homogenization of Trump voters¶VRFLDOFLUFOHV over time. Fig. 2 shows the percentage of like-
minded social contacts that Trump and Clinton voters reported in the USC poll. Extreme echo 
chambers would be seen in social circles that include nearly 100% like-minded individuals. In 
August 2016, individuals who eventually voted for Trump and those who eventually voted for 
Clinton had similarly diverse social circles. Respectively, their social circles included on average 
around 68% and 71% like-minded individuals. However, over time, social circles of Trump 
voters included increasingly more like-minded individuals. In contrast, we did not observe a 
similar increase in the homogeneity of Clinton voters¶VRFLDOFLUFOHV+HQFH the additional 
Trump voters were likely coming from people who previously did not plan on voting, were 
undecided, or were planning to vote for third candidates. It is also possible that Trump voters 
were more inclined to exclude Clinton supporters from their social circles than were Clinton 
voters to exclude Trump fans. In any case, the homogenization continued after the election, when 
Trump voters reported social circles consisting of on average 77% like-minded individuals, 
compared to 68% among Clinton voters. Just after the election, 42% of Trump voters had social 
circles that included 90% or more like-minded individuals, compared to only 30% of such 
participants among Clinton voters. When further investigating whether the homogeneity of social 
circles was related to sociodemographic variables (Extended Data Table 6 and Extended Data 
)LJVDQGZHIRXQGPRGHUDWHUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SROLWLFDOOHDQLQJVDJH
education, and U.S. state of residence. For Trump voters, homogenization of social circles was 
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particularly pronounced among older voters aged 65 or older, in particular in states that voted 
Republican. Education played an additional role, with less educated Trump voters homogenizing 
more and faster than more educated ones. In comparison, age did not predict homogenization for 
Clinton voters. In addition, in strongly Democrat states, more educated Clinton voters had 
somewhat more homogeneous circles than less educated ones (see Extended Figures 2 and 3). 
< FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
Taken together, our results make two contributions. )LUVWSHRSOH¶Vreports about their 
social circles can improve predictions of election results and enhance understanding of individual 
voting behaviour. We observe these findings across different poll designs in two countries with 
different political systems, suggesting that other election polls could potentially benefit from 
including social-circle questions. Social-circle questions may also be useful in surveys aiming to 
forecast other beliefs and behaviours. One reason for the usefulness of social-circle questions 
could be the increased implicit sample size, which was reflected in reduced standard errors of 
social-circle compared to own-intention questions. For GfK¶V poll, standard errors for 
predictions from social circles vs. own intentions were 0.78 vs. 1.22 for Clinton, 0.78 vs. 1.21 for 
Trump, and 0.31 vs. 0.77 for others.  Similarly, USC poll standard errors for predictions from 
own intentions were 0.92 vs. 1.35, 0.94 vs. 1.45, and 0.35 vs. 0.75. Social-circle reports might 
provide information about people who would otherwise be missing from polls due to coverage, 
sampling, or nonresponse errors12. Social-circle questions could therefore be particularly useful 
when polls must rely on relatively small samples in some states. Another reason for the 
usefulness of social-circle might be that participants who are reluctant to report that they favour a 
potentially embarrassing option could nevertheless be willing to report that their social circle 
favours it8,9)LQDOO\WKURXJKSURFHVVHVRIVRFLDOLQIOXHQFHLQGLYLGXDOV¶YRWLQJLQWHQWLRQVcould 
indeed become more similar to the prevailing opinion in their social circles over time10,11.  
Our second main finding is that asking about social circles can provide insights into the 
social dynamics that shape individual voting behaviour. We find interesting differences between 
Trump voters and Clinton voters. Trump voters seemed to be influenced by their peers and 
influencing them in turn (Fig. 1C and Extended Data Table 5). Clinton voters appeared to be 
mostly influenced by others while not influencing others themselves. One possible explanation 
for this finding is that Trump voters might have been more likely to project their own intentions 
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onto intentions of their peers, perceiving them as more similar to themselves than they were25. It 
is also possible that they were influencing their friends and family to vote for Trump, or that the 
composition of their social circles was changing over time to include more Trump supporters. 
These differences between Trump and Clinton voters are echoed by the finding of increased 
homogenisation of social circles of Trump, but not Clinton voters (Fig. 2). This pattern of 
homogenisation likely results from several inter-UHODWHGSURFHVVHV2QHLV7UXPSVXSSRUWHUV¶
LQFUHDVLQJVXVSLFLRQRIWKH³PDLQVWUHDPPHGLD´26 and greater reliance on in-group information 
VRXUFHV$QRWKHULV³XQIULHQGLQJ´RISHRSOHZLWKLncompatible political opinions, practiced by 
supporters of both candidates27. Perceived homogeneity can further increase if people are 
reluctant to disclose political views that are not in accord with the prevailing opinion among their 
peers28. Our results are in line with a recent analysis of Twitter data that showed significant 
homogeneity and isolation of Trump voters relative to supporters of other candidates29.  
Overall, social-circle questions are a way of tapping into the ³ORFDO´wisdom of crowds30-
32
. Standard election-winner questions attempted to tap into the wisdom of crowds by asking 
people about their predictions for overall election results2-4. This can be problematic because 
people do not have a direct experience with everyone in the general population. Instead, they 
have to make population inferences based at least in part on second-hand information, such as 
sometimes erroneous predictions reported in the media. In contrast, social-circle questions 
KDUYHVWSHRSOH¶Vdirect experiences with their immediate social environments5-7,33. It is important 
to note that survey sampling design will affect the usefulness of social-circle questions. If social-
circle reports come from a biased, non-representative sample of the overall population, their 
average will likely be a biased estimate of true population values. In well-designed samples of 
the population of interest social-circle questions can improve survey estimates, especially when 
these are otherwise based on small samples or when they pertain to socially sensitive beliefs and 
behaviours. In addition, social-circle reports can provide valuable information about social 
interactions that shape individual beliefs and behaviours.  
Methods: 
1. Aggregate polls 
For election predictions based on aggregate polls in the U.S., we used data from 1,106 
national polls21 and 3,073 state polls, summarized by the site FiveThirtyEight.com from 34. In 
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France, we used results of 20 different polls conducted in the week before election round 1, and 
18 before round 235. 
2. Individual polls 
We investigated the usefulness of social-circle questions in three individual polls, 
described below. All participants gave informed consent. The research was approved by the 
8QLYHUVLW\RI6RXWKHUQ&DOLIRUQLD¶V'RUQVLIH¶V,QVWLWXWLRQDO5HYLHZ%RDUG (USC poll), and the 
Federalwide Assurance Signatory Official of the Santa Fe Institute (all polls). 
2.1. USC Dornsife/LA Times Presidential Election Poll 
Question texts 
Introduction: In this interview, we will ask you questions about the upcoming general 
election for President of the United States on Tuesday November 8, 2016. All questions ask you 
to think about the percent chance that something will happen in the future. The percent chance 
can be thought of as the number of chances out of 100. You can use any number between 0 and 
)RUH[DPSOHQXPEHUVOLNHDQGSHUFHQWPD\EHµDOPRVWQRFKDQFH¶SHUFHQWRUVR
PD\PHDQµQRWPXFKFKDQFH¶DRUSHUFHQWFKDQFHPD\EHDµSUHWW\HYHQFKDQFH¶
SHUFHQWRUVRPD\PHDQDµYHU\JRRGFKDQFH¶DQGDRUSHUFHQWFKDQFHPD\EHµDOPRVW
FHUWDLQ¶ 
Own-intention questions: (a) What is the percent chance that you will vote in the 
Presidential election? (b)  If you do vote in the election, what is the percent chance that you will 
vote for Clinton? And for Trump? And for someone else? Order of candidates was randomized 
for this and other questions in all three polls. 
Social-circle questions: Now we would like you to think of your friends, family, 
colleagues, and other acquaintances of 18 years of age or older that you have communicated 
with at least briefly within the last month, either face-to-face, or otherwise. We will call these 
people your social contacts. (a) What percentage of your social contacts are likely to vote in the 
upcoming election for President? For instance, 0% means that you think none of your social 
contacts will vote, and 100% means that all of your social contacts will vote. If you are not sure, 
just try to give your best guess. (b) For the next question, please consider only those of your 
social contacts who are likely to vote in the upcoming election for U.S. President. Of all your 
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social contacts who are likely to vote, what percentage do you think will vote for Clinton, Trump, 
or someone else? For instance, 0% would mean that you think no voters in your social circle will 
vote for that candidate, and 100% means that all voters in your social circle will vote for that 
candidate. Again, if you are not sure, just try to give your best guess. 
Election-winner expectations questions: What is the percent chance that Clinton will 
win? And Trump? And other candidates? 
Sample 
Participants were members of the Understanding America Study at the University of 
Southern California's Dornsife Center for Economic and Social Research. This longitudinal 
study36 included close to 6,000 U.S. residents who were randomly selected from among all 
households in the United States using address-based sampling. They were recruited by a 
combination of mail, phone, and web surveys. Members of recruited households who did not 
have Internet access were provided with tablets and Internet service. In May 2016, all panel 
members who were U.S. citizens were asked to respond to a pre-election survey. Those who 
completed the study and agreed to participate constituted the election poll panel.  
Starting from July 4, 2016, each member of the poll panel was invited to answer the 
election poll once a week37. Members received the invitation to participate each week on the 
same day of the week, but they were allowed to respond up to 6 days later (i.e., until the day 
before the next invitation). On average across waves, study completion rates were 70%. As 
reported by UAS37, the average panel recruitment rate, reflecting those individuals who 
completed the initial mail survey among those who consented to participate in the UAS, was 
29.7%. The percentage of active panel members was 13.6%36. Combined with the study 
completion rate, the cumulative response rate for the studies reported here was 9.5%. 
Five study waves asked all three types of questions of interest for this study (own-
intention, social-circle, and election-winner questions): (1) July 11±23 (N=1,782), (2) August 8±
20 (N=2,726), (3) September 12±24 (N=2,882), (4) October 31±November 7 (N=2,240), and (5) 
after the election, November 9±21 (N=3,798). In all waves except Wave 4, all questions were 
asked together, In Wave 4 only, social-circle questions were asked in a separate questionnaire 
from own-likelihood and election-winner questions. That is, social-circle questions were asked 
starting from November 3, and all participants completed all questions within a window of about 
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3 days. The pattern of results presented in the main text does not change if we analyse only the 
969 participants who, in Wave 4, completed all questions on the same day. This would be 
expected because all pre-HOHFWLRQ³VXUSULVHV´RFFXUUHGEHIRUHWKLVVXUYH\SHULRG, with the last 
being the October 28 FBI announcement that they were re-RSHQLQJWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI&OLQWRQ¶V
emails.  
In this paper, we analysed two subsamples of participants: those who completed Wave 4 
(excluding a small number of participants who did not answer all questions, resulting in the total 
N=2,229), and those who completed each of the Waves 2, 3, 4, and 5 (N=1,263).  
Analyses 
Survey weights were constructed by a raking procedure that matched the sample to 
national population benchmarks based on the May 2016 Current Population Survey age by sex, 
race/ethnicity, sex by education, and household size by income. An additional weighting 
variable, reflecting whether or not participants voted in the 2012 election, was used to achieve 
representative proportions of voters for different candidates38. The weights were used only for 
the analyses on N=2,229 individuals who participated in the last wave before the election (results 
shown in Table 1). The analyses on N=1,263 individuals who participated in all survey waves 
from August to after the election were done on unweighted data, because the goal of these 
analyses was to describe that particular sample and not to make inferences about the overall 
population (Results in Figs. 1, 2, and Extended Data Figures and Tables). 
In line with previous studies using probabilistic questions about voting behaviour16,17, 
USC predictions of election outcomes ZHUHGHULYHGE\PXOWLSO\LQJHDFKSDUWLFLSDQW¶VRZQRU
social-FLUFOH¶VOLNHOLKRRGWRYRWHE\KLVKHURUKLVKHUVRFLDO-FLUFOH¶VOLNHOLKRRGWRYRWHIRUHDFK
of the candidates and (2) estimating the ratio of the resulting variable and the average of the 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶VRZQRUVRFLDO-FLUFOH¶VOLNHOLKRRGWRYRWe across all participants37. 
2.2. GfK Election Survey 
Question texts 
Own-intention questions: (a) How likely are you to vote in this upcoming election? (b) If 
\RXZHUHWRYRWHLQWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQWKDW¶VEHLQJKHOGRQ1RYHPEHUWKZKLFKFDQGLGDWH
would you choose? Response options were Clinton, Trump, Johnson, Stein, another candidate, 
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undecided, and would not vote. The question was slightly modified for those who were certain to 
vote/had already voted: 7KLQNLQJDERXWWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQWKDW¶VEHLQJKHOGRQ1RYHPEHU
8th, for whom will/did you vote? Likelihood to vote was additionally determined by asking 
whether participants were registered voters in their state of residence, and whether they had 
voted in previous elections.  
Social-circle questions: Same as for the USC poll. 
Sample 
3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHVHOHFWHGIURP*I.¶Vnational, probability-based online 
KnowledgePanel, which currently includes 55,000 active members39. They were primarily 
recruited using address-based sampling methods, including telephone follow-up for refusal 
conversions. Adults who were selected to join KnowledgePanel but did not have access to the 
Internet were provided with Internet access and a web-based device at no cost.  For this study, 
the KnowledgePanel sample included active panel members who were 18 years or older and 
lived in the United States at the time of the study. Participants were selected using a proprietary 
probability proportional to size (PPS) sample algorithm. As a result, the final sample reflected 
the demographic profile of adults 18 years or older based on targets derived from the March 
2016 Current Population Survey. The sample was also balanced in respect to party identification 
(Democrats, Republicans, and Independent/Others) as measured on an earlier panel profile 
survey, with target proportions based on the average values obtained from eight different 
probability-based national polls fielded in the two months prior to this study. 
A total of 4,181 members of KnowledgePanel were included here. The field period was 
November 4, 2016 (1:30 a.m. EST) to November 8, 2016 (11:45 a.m. EST). Of those who were 
invited, 2,367 members completed the survey (a 56.5% study completion rate). As reported by 
GfK40, the average panel recruitment rate for participants in this study was 13.0%. Of the 
recruited households, 62.4% completed the initial profile survey. Together with study completion 
rate, this leads to a cumulative response rate of 4.6%. 
Analyses 
Standard geodemographic weights were computed for all participants, regardless of voter 
registration and likelihood to vote, using iterative proportional fitting or raking.  National 
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population benchmarks based on March 2016 Current Population Survey data were used to 
create weighting targets based on region, age by sex, education, income, and race/ethnicity40. 
Predictions based on own likelihood to vote for different candidates, shown in Table 1 
and Fig. 1, were weighted answers to this question for the subset of participants who were likely 
voters. These were determined by self-reports as all who indicated being registered voters in the 
state of their residence, were definitely likely to vote or had already voted, or said they would 
probably vote and also indicated they always or almost always voted in elections. In all, 1,897 of 
the respondents were determined to be likely voters (80.1% of all participants). Of those, 1,822 
answered both the question about own likelihood to vote for different candidates and the 
questions about social-circle likelihood to vote. Predictions based on social-circle likelihood to 
vote for different candidates were obtained as described in the section about USC methodology 
above.  
2.3. BVA French Presidential Election Poll 
Question texts 
2ZQLQWHQWLRQV3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGDERXWWKHLUYRWLQJLQWHQWLRQVLQWKHILUVWDQGWKH
VHFRQGURXQGRIWKHHOHFWLRQXVLQJWKHVWDQGDUG%9$PHWKRGRORJ\'XULQJWKHILUVWURXQGRIWKH
SUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQZKLFKFDQGLGDWHDUH\RXPRVWOLNHO\WRYRWHIRU"/RUVGXSUHPLHUWRXUGH
O¶pOHFWLRQSUpVLGHQWLHOOHTXHOVHUDLWOHFDQGLGDWSRXUOHTXHOLO\DXUDLWOHSOXVGHFKDQFHTXHYRXV
YRWLH]"5HVSRQVHRSWLRQVZHUHWKHFDQGLGDWHVDVZHOODV,ZLOOQRWJRYRWHXVHGWRLQIHU
SDUWLFLSDWLRQUDWHVDQG,ZLOOYRWHEODQN)RUWKHVHFRQGURXQGSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHG+HUHLV
WKHOLVWRIFDQGLGDWHVZKRDFFRUGLQJWRSROOVVKRXOGLQFOXGHWKHTXDOLILHGIRUWKHVHFRQG
URXQG&RXOG\RXLQGLFDWHKRZ\RXZRXOGUDQNHDFKRIWKHP"9RLFLODOLVWHGHVFDQGLGDWVSDUPL
OHVTXHOVG¶DSUqVOHVVRQGDJHVGHYUDLHQWVHWURXYHUOHVTXDOLILpVGXVHFRQGWRXU3RXUULH]YRXV
LQGLTXHUGDQVO¶RUGUHGHYRVSUpIpUHQFHVOHVFDQGLGDWV«5HVSRQVHRSWLRQVZHUHWKHIRXUWRS
FDQGLGDWHVDQG1RQHRIWKHP 
Social-circle questions for the first round of election asked: (a) According to you, what 
share of your social circle will go vote in the first round of the election? (A votre avis, quelle est 
ODSDUWGHYRWUHHQWRXUDJHTXLLUDYRWHUDXSUHPLHUWRXUGHO¶pOHFWLRQ" and (b) Amongst the 
members of your social circle who should go vote in the first round of the presidential election, 
how do you expect their votes to be distributed between the different candidates? (Parmi les 
14 
 
PHPEUHVGHYRWUHHQWRXUDJHTXLGHYUDLWDOOHUYRWHUDXSUHPLHUWRXUGHO¶pOHFWLRQSUpVLGHQWLHOOH
comment devraient se répartir les votes en faveur des différents candidat?) The options were 
Dupont-Aignan, Fillon, Hamon, Le Pen, Macron, Mélenchon, other candidates, and voting 
blank. For the second round, participants were asked: (a) ³Suppose that Emmanuel Macron and 
Marine Le Pen are the candidates in the second round. What will be the share of your social 
FLUFOHWKDWZLOOJRYRWHLQWKHVHFRQGURXQG"´6XSSRVRQVTX¶(PPDQXHO0DFURQHW0DULQH/H
Pen soient les candidats du second tour. Quelle est la part de votre entourage qui ira voter au 
second tour?) and (b) a similar question as in the first round focused on only Le Pen, Macron, 
and not voting for either of them.  
Sample 
In line with standard French polling practices41, the sample was selected from the BVA 
online access panel by quota sampling. The quotas were designed to represent the French 
population by gender, age, partisan affiliation, employment, region, and settlement size, 
following the guidelines of the French National Statistical Institute. Only registered voters were 
contacted. The survey took place from April 17 to 22, 2017, just before the first round of election 
on April 23. According to BVA, of 1,685 people who satisfied the quota and were invited to 
participate, 59.5% completed the study, for the final sample of 1,003 participants.  
Analyses 
Post-stratification weights were used to adjust the sample frequencies to the general 
population according to gender, age, employment, region, and settlement size.  
Predictions based on own likelihood to vote, shown in Table 2, were weighted answers of 
all participants (who were all registered voters, by design) to the questions about intention to 
vote for different candidates, to vote blank, or to not vote, in the first and second round. 
Predictions based on social circle questions were obtained as described in the section about USC 
methodology above, using answers to questions about the percentage of social circle who will 
not vote or will vote blank, and who will vote for different candidates among those social 
contacts who will vote.  
Data availability 
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The data that support the findings of this research are available from the corresponding 
author upon request. 
Code availability 
Stata and SPSS codes for all analyses are available from the corresponding author upon 
request. 
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Figure 1. Shifts in average individual voting intentions and behaviour (A) were announced by 
shifts in social circles (B). Error bars in (B) show within-subjects 95% confidence intervals42. 
Granger causality tests in (C) suggest that social circles influenced own intentions reported 
weeks later. For Trump voters, own intentions also appeared to influence subsequent social-
circle reports. Results are for N=LQGLYLGXDOVZKRSDUWLFLSDWHGLQ86&¶Vsurvey waves in 
August, September, early November, and immediately after the election. Because we are 
interested in predictions of individual behaviour in this particular sample, estimates are adjusted 
for likelihood of voting (see Methods) and otherwise unweighted.  
A. B. 
C. 
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Figure 2. 7KHH[WHQWRI³HFKRFKDPEHUV´DPRQJ&OLQWRQDQG7UXPSYRWHUVRYHUWLPH Data are 
for N=1,263 individuals who participated in all four study waves. Shown are unweighted 
SURSRUWLRQVRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶VRFLDOFLUFOHVWKDWWKH\UHSRUWHGZRXOGYRWHRUKDGYRWHGIRUWKHLU
preferred candidate.  
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Table 1. Actual results of the U.S. 2016 presidential election, predictions based on survey 
questions, and indicators of SUHGLFWLRQV¶ accuracy 
 Actual 
election 
outcome 
Aggregate 
polls  GfK poll USC poll 
 
Own 
intention 
Own 
intention 
Social 
circle 
Own 
intention 
Social 
circle 
Participation rate 54.8 - 76.5  72.8 80.4 76.4 
% of popular vote     
   Clinton 48.2 45.7 46.2 50.2 44.8 45.5 
   Trump 46.1 41.8 43.2 43.7 46.3 49.4 
   Other 5.7 12.5 10.6 6.1  8.9  5.1  
Electoral votes to 
Clinton (based on state-
level predictions of 
popular vote) 
232 323 298 293 305 258 
Error measures for national predictions (state-level predictions) of popular vote 
Error of predicted difference 
between 2 main candidates 
(Mosteller 5) 
1.8  
(1.3) 
0.9  
(1.5) 
4.4 
(5.0) 
-3.6 
(-0.6) 
-6.0 
(-1.4) 
Average absolute error of predicted 
vote share for all candidates 
(Mosteller 3) 
4.5  
(2.1) 
3.3 
(7.1) 
1.6 
(3.9) 
2.3 
(6.6) 
2.2 
(5.9) 
Average absolute log ratio of 
predicted and actual odds for all 
candidates (ܣҧ) 0.38  (0.14) 0.29 (0.47) 0.08 (0.24) 0.21 (0.45) 0.12 (0.35) 
Note: Results of the GfK poll were based on a probabilistic national sample of N=1,822 participants 
interviewed from November 3 to the morning of November 8. Results of the USC poll were based on a 
probabilistic national sample of N=2,229 participants interviewed from October 31 to November 7. For 
error measures, lower absolute values are better. For aggregate polls, question wording varied. ,Q*I.¶V
poll, own-intention questions askHGZKLFKFDQGLGDWHSDUWLFLSDQWVZRXOGYRWHIRUDQGLQ86&¶VSROOWKH\
asked participants to judge the percent chance of voting for each candidate. Comparison with actual 
election results as well as with aggregate results of 1,106 national polls (for predictions of popular vote) 
and 3,073 state polls (for predictions of electoral votes) as summarized at fivethirtyeight.com21,34 suggest 
that both GfK and USC polls have satisfactory accuracy. Note that Clinton eventually received 227 and 
Trump 304 electoral votes, because some electors have defected. 
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Table 2. Actual and predicted results of the French 2017 presidential election, and indicators of 
SUHGLFWLRQV¶DFFXUDF\ 
 Election round 1 Election round 2 
 
Actual 
election 
results 
Aggregate 
polls: 
Own 
intention  
BVA  
poll:  
Own 
intention  
BVA  
poll: 
Social 
circle 
Actual 
election 
results 
Aggregate 
polls: 
Own 
intention  
BVA  
poll:  
Own 
intention  
BVA  
poll: 
Social 
circle 
Participation rate* 75.8 73.2 89.6 74.7 66.0 74.0 81.3 68.7 
% of popular vote         
   Macron 24.0 23.8 25.9 24.6 66.1 60.8 62.3 64.2 
   Le Pen 21.3 22.3 22.3 21.8 33.9 39.2 38.5 35.8 
   Fillon 20.0 19.5 15.2 17.3     
   Mélenchon 19.6 18.9 19.7 19.6     
   Hamon 6.4 7.6 7.3 8.8     
   Others 8.7 7.9 9.6 7.9     
Error measures         
Error of predicted difference 
between main candidates 
(Macron & Le Pen, Mosteller 5) 
-1.2 0.8 0.1  -10.6 -8.4 -3.9 
Average absolute error of 
predicted vote share for all 
candidates (Mosteller 3) 
0.8 1.6 1.2  5.3 4.2 1.9 
Average absolute log ratio of 
predicted and actual odds for all 
candidates (ܣҧ) .08 .12 .11  .23 .18 .09 
Note: Results of the BVA poll were based on a national quota sample of N=1,003 participants interviewed 
from April 17-22, 2017. For error measures, lower values are better. For comparison, we provide actual 
election results, as well as aggregate polls results based on questions about own voting intentions asked in 
20 different polls in a week before election round 1, and 18 before round 235. Note that compared to 
aggregate polls own-intention predictions from the BVA poll has satisfactory accuracy. Within the BVA 
poll, social-circle predictions always outperform those based on own-intention ones. *Non-participation 
count includes people who did not vote as well as those who casted blank ballots.  
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Extended Data Figure 1. Own intentions and social-circle reports for nine different groups of 
participants, defined by the correspondence of their voting intentions a week before the election 
and their actual voting behaviour. Participants whose actual voting behaviour was in line with 
their stated intentions had social circles with higher percentage of individuals intending to vote 
for the same candidate (panels on the diagonal, A, E, and I). In contrast, participants who 
switched from their intended candidate to another candidate (panels B and D) had more 
heterogeneous social circles, equally likely to support both main candidates. Also interesting are 
participants who said they would not vote but who did vote (panels G and H). Both they and 
their social circles showed much stronger preference for a particular candidate over time than the 
participants who said they would not vote and indeed did not (panel I). Finally, participants who 
said they would vote but did not had similar profiles as those who said they would vote for a 
particular candidate and did so (panels C vs. A, and F vs. E), suggesting that most non-voters 
ended up not voting for reasons unrelated to their voting preferences. Data are for N=1,263 
LQGLYLGXDOVZKRSDUWLFLSDWHGLQ86&¶VVXUYH\ZDYHVLQ$XJXVW6HSWHPEHU, early November, and 
immediately after the election. Shown are unweighted probabilities of voting for Trump and 
Clinton that participants provided for themselves and their social circles. Participants were 
classified as being likely to vote for a particular candidate only if they reported more than 50% 
FKDQFHWKDWWKH\ZRXOGYRWHLQWKHHOHFWLRQRWKHUZLVHWKH\ZHUHFODVVLILHGDV³ZLOOQRWYRWH´
Error bars show ±1 standard error.   
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Extended Data Figure 2. Changes in percentage of like-minded members of their social circle, 
for participants who voted for different candidates, belonged to different age groups, and were 
from different states (RR: predicted Republican±voted Republican; DR: predicted Democrat±
voted Republican; DD: predicted Democrat±voted Democrat). Error bars are ±1 standard error. 
Data are for N=1,263 individuals who participated in all four study waves. Shown are 
XQZHLJKWHGSURSRUWLRQVRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶VRFLDOFLUFOHVWKDWWKH\UHSRUWHGZRXOG vote (or had 
voted) for their preferred candidate.   
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
so
ci
a
l 
ci
rc
le
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
in
g
 T
ru
m
p
 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
so
ci
a
l 
ci
rc
le
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
in
g
 C
li
n
to
n
 
26 
 
 
Extended Data Figure 3. Changes in percentage of like-minded members of their social circle, 
for participants who voted for different candidates, belonged to different education (Edu) groups, 
and were from different states (RR: predicted Republican±voted Republican; DR: predicted 
Democrat±voted Republican; DD: predicted Democrat±voted Democrat). Error bars are ±1 
standard error. Data are for N=1,263 individuals who participated in all four study waves. Shown 
DUHXQZHLJKWHGSURSRUWLRQVRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶VRFLDOFLUFOHVWKDWWKH\UHSorted would vote (or had 
voted) for their preferred candidate.   
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Extended Data Table 1. Social-circle reports provided a week before the election contribute to 
the explanation of post-election reports of voting behaviour, over and above own voting 
intentions and election-winner expectations. Results of linear regressions for voting in the 
election (vs. not) and voting for different candidates. 
 Voting behaviour reported post-election (November 9-21) 
Voted at all 
b (SE) 
Voted for Trump 
b (SE) 
Voted for Clinton 
b (SE) 
Voted for other 
candidate b (SE) 
Model with only own voting intentions (October 31-November 7) 
Own voting 
intentions  
.94**  
(.02) 
.97**  
(.01) 
.96**  
(.01) 
.82**  
(.02) 
Constant 2.46  
(1.97) 
3.11**  
(.80) 
.53  
(.86) 
-.16  
(.53) 
AIC 11,351 9,501 9,636 9,165 
Model with own voting intentions + social-circle reports (October 31-November 7) 
Own voting 
intentions 
   .91**  
        (.02) 
.89** 
              (.02) 
.89** 
             (.02) 
.80** 
                (.02) 
Social-circle reports .10**  
(.03) 
.15**  
(.03) 
.14** 
(.03) 
.09  
(.06) 
Constant -3.20 
        (2.62) 
-.74  
(1.06) 
 -2.48*  
(1.08) 
-.49  
(.57) 
AIC 11,342 9,473 9,618 9,165 
Model with own voting intentions + social-circle reports + election-winner expectations  
(October 31-November 7) 
Own voting 
intentions  
.89**  
           (.02) 
.89**  
            (.02) 
              .80**  
             (.02) 
Social-circle reports 
 
.15**  
           (.03) 
.14**  
            (.03) 
              .09 
             (.06) 
Election-winner 
expectations  
            .01  
           (.03) 
            -.03  
            (.03) 
             -.07  
             (.08) 
Constant 
 
           -.92  
         (1.24) 
          -1.58  
          (1.51) 
             -.48  
             (.57) 
AIC  9,475 9,620 9,166 
Note: Analysis of voting vs. not voting is based on N=1,263 individuals who participated in the USC election poll in 
August, September, late October/early November, and immediately after the election. Analyses of voting for Trump, 
Clinton, and other candidates are based on those participants who voted in the election (N=1,086). Regression 
coefficients for own voting intentions, social-circle reports and election-winner expectations refer to the behaviour 
mentioned in the associated column header. All estimates are unweighted. *p<.05, **p<=.01. Binary correlations 
(Pearson r) between own intentions and social circles are for voting .41, for Trump .75, for Clinton .74, for other 
.43. Variance inflation factors for models with social-circle reports are nevertheless low: for voting 1.2, for Trump 
2.5, for Clinton 2.5, for Other 1.2. Even though the criteria analysed here are all binary variables, we present linear 
rather than logit regressions for several reasons17: (a) our starting hypothesis was that participants correctly report 
their actual voting probabilities P i, rather than overestimating small values and underestimating large ones, which 
would be implied by a logit model with P i as an explanatory variable; (b) implementing this hypothesis into a logit 
model with ln(P i/(1-P i)) as an explanatory variable would leave many cases undefined as many respondents gave 
either a 0% or a 100% answer; (c) our explanatory variables are probabilities that bound most of the predictions to a 
range of approximately 0% to 100%; (d) linear regression provides a convenient way of assessing our predictors 
(own intentions and social-circle reports). If they are perfect, their linear coefficients should sum to 1, and the 
intercept should be indistinguishable from 0. The fact that we observe roughly such a pattern in all linear regressions 
except the one for other candidates suggests that own intentions and social-circle reports are good predictors of own 
voting intentions. These conclusions were completely supported by additional logit regression analyses. 
AIC=Akaike Information Criterion. 
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Extended Data Table 2a. Social-circle reports provided in August contribute to the explanation 
of voting intentions in September, over and above own voting intentions provided in August. 
Results of linear regressions for intentions to vote in the election and intentions to vote for 
different candidates. 
  Intentions reported September 12-24 
Intention to 
vote 
b (SE) 
Intention to vote 
for Trump vs. 
another candidate 
b (SE) 
Intention to vote 
for Clinton vs. 
another candidate 
b (SE) 
Intention to vote for 
other candidate vs. 
Trump or Clinton 
b (SE) 
Model with only own voting intentions (August 8-20) 
Own voting 
intentions 
.86**  
      (.01) 
.94**  
           (.01) 
.94**  
            (.01) 
.84**  
             (.01) 
Constant 13.5**  
       (1.18) 
3.46**  
            (.56) 
2.32**  
             (.60) 
1.78**  
              (.48) 
AIC 10,130 10,368 10,416 10,422 
Model with own voting intentions + social-circle reports (August 8-20) 
Own voting 
intentions 
.83**  
      (.01) 
.89** 
           (.02) 
.89**  
            (.01) 
.80**  
             (.02) 
Social-circle reports .07**  
      (0.02) 
.10**  
           (.02) 
.09**  
            (.02) 
.12**  
             (.03) 
Constant 
9.76**  
     (1.48) 
1.23  
              (.71) 
.01  
            (.76) 
1.4  
                 (.49) 
AIC 10,115 10,344 10,396 10,409 
Note: Analysis of voting vs. not voting is based on N=1,263 individuals who participated in the USC election poll in 
August, September, late October/early November, and immediately after the election. Regression coefficients for 
own voting intentions and social-circle reports refer to the behaviour mentioned in the associated column header. All 
estimates are unweighted. *p<.05, **p<=.01. Election-winner expectations do not contribute to explanation of own 
intentions, except for Clinton (b = .05, SE = .02, p = .04, AIC = 10,393). 
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Extended Data Table 2b. Social-circle reports provided in September contribute to the 
explanation of voting intentions in late October and November, over and above own voting 
intentions provided in September. Results of linear regressions for intentions to vote in the 
election and intentions to vote for different candidates. 
  Intentions reported from October 31 to November 7 
Intention to 
vote 
b (SE) 
Intention to vote 
for Trump vs. 
another candidate 
b (SE) 
Intention to vote 
for Clinton vs. 
another candidate 
b (SE) 
Intention to vote for 
other candidate vs. 
Trump or Clinton 
b (SE) 
Model with only own voting intentions (September 12-24) 
Own voting 
intentions 
.84**  
      (.02) 
.97**  
           (.01) 
.95**  
            (.01) 
.78**  
             (.02) 
Constant 15.2**  
       (1.52) 
3.53**  
            (.77) 
2.92**  
            (.83) 
.44   
(.61) 
AIC 10,673 11,135 11,279 11,018 
Model with own voting intentions + social-circle reports (September 12-24) 
Own voting 
intentions 
.81**  
      (.02) 
.91**  
           (.02) 
.89**  
            (.02) 
.74**  
             (.02) 
Social-circle reports .09**  
      (.02) 
.10**  
           (.03) 
.13**  
            (.03) 
.11**  
             (.04) 
Constant 
    10.94**  
    (1.84) 
.95  
            (1.03) 
            -.37  
          (1.08) 
              .10  
             (.62) 
AIC 10,659 11,123 11,259 11,013 
Note: Analysis of voting vs. not voting is based on N=1,263 individuals who participated in the USC election poll in 
August, September, late October/early November, and immediately after the election. Regression coefficients for 
own voting intentions and social-circle reports refer to the behaviour mentioned in the associated column header. All 
estimates are unweighted. *p<.05, **p<=.01. Election-winner expectations do not contribute to explanation of own 
intentions, except for Clinton (b = .08, SE = .03, p = .02, AIC = 11,256). 
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Extended Data Table 3. Relation between reported voting intentions and actual voting 
behaviour: Percentage (N) of participants for each combination of intentions and behavior.  
   Voting behaviour reported post-election  (November 9-21) Total voting  
intentions Did not 
vote 
Voted for 
Trump 
Voted for 
Clinton 
Voted for 
other 
Voted±
unknowna 
Total voting behaviour 14%  
(177) 
40%  
(502) 
38%  
(484) 
7% 
(87) 
1% 
(13) 
          100%  
        (1,263) 
Own voting intentions (October 31±November 7) 
  Will not voteb 87%  
(125) 
5%  
(7) 
6%  
(8) 
1% 
(2) 
1% 
(2) 
11%  
(144) 
  Will vote for Trump 3%  
(17) 
94%  
(458) 
1%  
(7) 
0% 
(1) 
1%  
(3) 
38%  
(486) 
  Will vote for Clinton 4%  
(22) 
3%  
(13) 
91%  
(454) 
2% 
(8) 
1%  
(3) 
40%  
(500) 
  Will vote for Other 11%  
(10) 
9%  
(9) 
5%  
(5) 
72% 
(68) 
3%  
(3) 
8%  
(95) 
  Undecided 8%  
(3) 
39%  
(15) 
26%  
(10) 
21%  
(8) 
5%  
(2) 
3%  
(38) 
Note: Columns 2±6 sum to 100%. The intended candidate is defined as the one to whom the participant assigned the 
highest probability of voting for (if several candidates are given the same probability, the participant is coded as 
undecided). aParticipants who reported they had voted but not for whom. Results are for N=1,263 individuals who 
participated in survey waves in August, September, late October/early November, and immediately after the 
election. bParticipants who said there was a less than 50% chance they would vote in the election.  
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Extended Data Table 4. Dynamic interplay between own intentions and social circles over time: 
results of vector autoregression modeling23,24 
  Trump voters Clinton voters Other voters 
coef. (SE) coef. (SE) coef. (SE) 
Voting in the election 
  Own intentions       
     Lag 1 own intentions 0.96** (0.20) 1.18** (0.28) 0.86** (0.27) 
     Lag 1 social circle 0.20** (0.08) 0.17* (0.08) 0.33 (0.20) 
  Social circle       
     Lag 1 own intentions 1.05** (0.35) -0.25 (0.35) 0.19 (0.17) 
     Lag 1 social circle 0.38** (0.15) -0.09 (0.11) 0.27 (0.29) 
Voting for a particular candidate 
  Own intentions       
     Lag 1 own intentions 1.46** (0.23) 2.16** (0.52) 4.70 (3.65) 
     Lag 1 social circle 0.65** (0.18) 1.24* (0.51) 0.31 (0.79) 
  Social circle       
     Lag 1 own intentions 0.69** (0.15) -0.35 (0.22) -2.49 (1.97) 
     Lag 1 social circle 0.64** (0.13) -0.35 (0.23) -0.09 (0.44) 
Note: Analyses are based on unweighted probabilities to vote for Trump and Clinton, which participants provided 
for themselves and their social circles. See main text for additional details. Results are for N=1,263 individuals who 
participated in survey waves in August, September, late October/early November, and immediately after the 
election. *p<.05. **p 
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Extended Data Table 5. Social circles influence voting behaviour of Trump and Clinton voters: 
Granger causality tests23,24 for the influence of social circles as reported in the current wave on 
own intentions to vote in the next wave, and vice versa, for the influence of own intentions to 
vote in the current wave on social circle reports in the next wave 
  Trump voters Clinton voters Other voters 
Ȥ2 p Ȥ2 p Ȥ2 p 
Voting in the election 
  Social circles cause own intentions 6.24 .012 4.87 .027 2.70 .100 
  Own intentions cause social circles 9.12 .003 0.50 .481 1.20 .273 
Voting for a particular candidate 
  Social circles cause own intentions 13.15 .000 5.87 .015 0.16 .693 
  Own intentions cause social circles 21.93 .000 0.12 .116 1.60 .206 
Note: Analyses are based on unweighted probabilities of voting for Trump and Clinton, which participants provided 
for themselves and their social circles. Results are for N=1,263 individuals who participated in survey waves in 
August, September, late October/early November, and immediately after the election. 
 
  
UNDER REVIEW ʹ PLEASE DO NOT SHARE 
33 
 
Extended Data Table 6. Repeated-measures analysis of variance to test the extent and 
PRGHUDWRUVRIDYHUDJHOHYHOV³EHWZHHQLQGLYLGXDOV´DQGFKDQJHVRYHUWLPH³ZLWKLQ
LQGLYLGXDOV´LQSHUFHQWage of like-minded voters 
  Trump voters Clinton voters 
F p F p 
Between individuals 
    
  Age  5.76 .003 1.20 .302 
  Education  0.37 .693 0.32 .723 
  State category 0.58 .558 4.41 .013 
  Age × Education 1.10 .356 1.49 .205 
  Age × State category 0.80 .525 1.07 .369 
  Education × State category 1.97 .098 1.62 .168 
Within individuals 
    
  Wave 9.82 .000 4.60 .010 
  Wave × Age  2.89 .021 0.17 .954 
  Wave × Education  0.85 .494 0.68 .604 
  Wave × State category 3.72 .005 0.11 .979 
  Wave × Age × Education 0.92 .497 0.42 .908 
  Wave × Age × State category 2.01 .043 0.58 .792 
  Wave × Education × State category 1.91 .055 2.25 .022 
Adjusted R2 .64  .65  
Note: Age is coded as up to 34, 35±64, and 65+ years. Education is coded as high school or less, some college, 
college or more. States are coded as predicted Republican±voted Republican, predicted Democrat±voted 
Republican, and predicted Democrat±voted Democrat. Extended Data Figs. 2 and 3 illustrate statistically reliable 
interactions, noted here in bold. Higher order interactions are not statistically reliable. Greenhouse±Geisser epsilon 
is .99 for Trump voters and .98 for Clinton voters; Huynh±Feldt correction for sphericity is used for within-
individual estimates. Results are for N=1,263 individuals who participated in survey waves in August, September, 
late October/early November, and immediately after the election. The results can be interpreted as follows (see also 
Extended Data Figs. 2 and 3): For Trump voters, homogenization of social circles was particularly pronounced 
DPRQJROGHUYRWHUVDJHGRUROGHULQSDUWLFXODULQVWDWHVWKDWYRWHG5HSXEOLFDQLQFOXGLQJWKRVH³FULWLFDOVWDWHV´
that were predicted to vote Democrat). In states that voted Democrat, Trump voters in this age group started to 
homogenize a bit later than in states voting Republican (from September rather than from August 2016). Trump 
voters in other age groups showed a bit less homogenization, although there was a positive trend among younger 
groups in strongly Republican states. Education played an additional role, with less educated Trump voters 
homogenizing more and faster than more educated ones across states. For Clinton voters, age did not predict 
homogenization, but education and state did. In strongly Republican states, Clinton voters with higher education had 
the least homogeneous social circles. However, in strongly Democrat states, more educated Clinton voters had 
somewhat more homogeneous circles than less educated ones, in particular earlier in the election period (in August 
2016).  
 
 
 
 
